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ABSTRACT:      The paper presents a discussion on the water crisis that occurred between 2013 and 2015 in the Metropolitan 
Region of São Paulo, the lack of integrated natural resources planning, and the reaction of social actors 
affected by the crisis. The region was affected by an extreme hydrological and climatological event, which was 
combined with the unsustainable management of water resources. The paper addresses, initially, the dynamics 
of water governance in the region, and the main aspects related to water availability and climate dependence 
that caused the water crisis. Then, we present an analysis of the process that led to the water crisis and its main 
developments, which is based on the follow-up of the different moments of the crisis and dialogues with its 
relevant stakeholders. The results indicate the relevance of emphasizing issues on matters such as the lack of 
transparency and highlight the role of societal initiatives. We conclude the paper with a proposition to discuss 
governance processes that can contribute to the development of more effective initiatives in order to reduce 
the impact of this visible change in water regimes, strengthen transparent management, and promote a more 
democratic interaction between social actors and the government.
                            Keywords: water governance; environmental justice; São Paulo; governing complexity; water scarcity.
RESUMO:          O artigo discute a crise da água que ocorreu entre 2013 e 2015 na Região Metropolitana de São Paulo, a falta 
de planejamento integrado de recursos naturais e a reação dos atores sociais afetados pelos impactos. A região 
foi afetada por um evento hidrológico e climatológico extremo combinado com um manejo insustentável dos 
recursos hídricos. O artigo aborda, inicialmente, a dinâmica da governança da água na região e os principais 
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aspectos que provocaram a emergência da crise hídrica, atrelados à disponibilidade de água e à dependência 
climática. Em seguida, é feita uma análise do processo ocorrido e dos principais desdobramentos da crise da 
água. Nossa análise é baseada no acompanhamento dos diferentes momentos da crise e em diálogos com as 
partes interessadas, e indica a relevância de enfatizar questões como a falta de transparência, além de destacar 
o papel das iniciativas da sociedade. Concluímos o artigo propondo a discussão de processos de governança 
que possam contribuir para o desenvolvimento de iniciativas mais efetivas, a fim de reduzir o impacto dessa 
mudança visível nos regimes hídricos, fortalecer a gestão transparente e promover uma interação mais 
democrática entre atores sociais e o governo.
                            Palavras-chave: governança da água; justiça ambiental; São Paulo; governando a complexidade; escassez hídrica.
1. Introduction
Water crises have multiplied in many parts 
of the planet. Besides those usually affected, the 
picture has become more recurrent in cities such 
as São Paulo, Brasília, Rome, Nairobi, and regions 
like California and Australia (Jacobi et al., 2019). 
Successive supply crises overlap, making it difficult 
to replenish water reservoirs fully. As a result, these 
reservoirs end up with a low volume of stored water, 
making this new scenario almost permanent (Braga 
& Kelman, 2016).
In this article, we propose an analysis of the 
water crisis in the Metropolitan Region of São 
Paulo (MRSP) between 2013 and 2015, using as a 
conceptual framework the approaches of governing 
complexity and environmental injustice. There is a 
constant tension in the process of dispute around 
the decision-making and its outcomes. Hence, it is 
a challenge to improve equity in the distribution of 
water in the metropolis and to reduce and balance 
distortions in this process, strengthening the access 
to the public water supply system (Ribeiro, 2011; 
Fracalanza & Freire, 2015; Rodrigues & Villela, 
2015).
Transparency and accountability are crucial in 
the process of democratic governance (Frey, 2012). 
In a context of the implementation of participative 
governance, multiple categories of stakeholders, 
institutions, and inter-relations are involved, each 
of them representing not only specific arrangements 
and interests at stake but also possibilities of nego-
tiation (Momm et al., 2013; Travassos & Schult, 
2013; Jacobi et al., 2018).
It’s demands interdependencies that indicate 
the limitations of the government and the need for 
strong links with local governments, the private 
sector, and social organizations (Xavier et al., 
2019). The challenge is to articulate the actions 
of different public actors, including watersheds 
committees, as defined by the Brazilian water 
legislation. Furthermore, the period between 2013 
and 2015 showed that it is no longer possible to 
govern natural resources on a metropolitan scale 
with centralized decisions, such as the case of São 
Paulo.  The crisis showed that the interdependence 
of natural resources related to water supply needs 
to be addressed on a macro scale, involving stake-
holders and extrapolating traditional frontiers and 
business as usual as paths of planning and mana-
gement (Zioni et al., 2019; Travassos et al., 2020).
Although the water crisis has affected the 
majority of São Paulo citizens, the impacts were 
not felt equally (Fracalanza & Freire, 2015). The 
Desenvolv. Meio Ambiente, v. 53, p. 61-77, jan./jun. 2020. 63
most vulnerable populations of the MRSP suffered 
the hardest effects. The emergence of social groups 
and actors, in an environmental justice perspective 
(Acselrad, 2002), was crucial in highlighting the 
crisis and its impacts on the residents, and in facing 
the official communication battle with the State 
Government. In this sense, the article also seeks to 
contribute to the necessary dialogue between ap-
proaches to governance and environmental justice.
2. Methods
The article is structured by a literature review 
on governance and environmental justice, suppor-
ted by secondary empirical data, which aims to 
recover the intricacies of the 2013-2015 water 
crisis in the metropolitan region of São Paulo. The 
main sources of quantitative data and documents 
from primary sources were obtained from the São 
Paulo State Sanitation Company (Sabesp), and the 
Meteorological Station of the Astronomical and 
Geophysical Institute of University of São Paulo 
- (IAG/USP). The secondary sources are from the 
Climate Prediction Center of the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (CPC/NOAA) and 
the Research Group on Environmental Governance 
(GovAmb) of the Institute of Energy and Environ-
ment with the NGO Institute of Democracy and 
Sustainability  (IDS).
3. Water governance in metropolitan São 
Paulo 
Since 1997, the Brazilian model of water ma-
nagement proposes an integrated, decentralized, and 
participatory policy framework (Rodrigues & Ville-
la, 2015). This model innovates as it gives power to 
decentralized water basin institutions and requires 
a process of negotiation between different public 
agents, users, and organized civil society (Jacobi, 
2004; Jacobi, 2009). The Metropolitan Region of 
São Paulo is composed of 39 municipalities with 
a population of over 21 million inhabitants, repre-
senting 46% of the population of the state of São 
Paulo and 55% of the state’s GDP (IBGE, 2013). 
Besides the high population density, the region is 
also marked by the complexity of its urban envi-
ronment, which presents a high occupation and 
cluttered and intense use of land (Jacobi, 2013; 
Travassos & Schult, 2013). 
The population growth in the MRSP (Figure 
1) required investments by the State Company of 
Basic Sanitation of the State of São Paulo (Sabesp) 
in order to expand the supply system, be it with the 
increase of the capacity of the treatment plants or 
with the development of the water sources. Sabesp 
is a public company with both public and private 
capital that was founded in 1973 and is currently 
responsible for providing water and collecting and 
treating sewage in 366 municipalities of the State 
of São Paulo (Ribeiro, 2011). 
Sabesp is one of the world’s largest sanitation 
companies in terms of population served, since not 
only it supplies water to 27.9 million people and 
provides sewage collection services to 21.6 million 
people, it is also responsible for around 27% of the 
investments in basic sanitation in Brazil (SABESP, 
2019). 
Public water supply in the MRSP is made 
through eight water treatment plants operated by 
Sabesp, which is also responsible for the sanitation 
of 39 of its municipalities, serving more than 20 
million people. Analyzing Table 1, it is possible to 
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verify that Guaraú, one of the plants, is responsi-
ble for the supply of nine million inhabitants, i.e., 
45% of the water consumed (Table 1). The Guaraú 
treatment station captures water from a system of in-
terconnected water reservoirs called Cantareira (Fi-
gure 2). Thus, the water supply of the Metropolitan 
Region of São Paulo has a significant dependence on 
the water reservoirs of the Cantareira system, which 
are connected to the treatment station of Guaraú. 
Before the crisis, this system was responsible for su-
pplying the MRSP with 31m3/s of water (45.1% of 
the total consumption of MRSP), of which 24.8m3/s 
were used by household consumption.
FIGURE 1 – Population Growth in the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo 2004-2012. 
SOURCE: Adapted from IBGE (2013).
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Producer System Production (m3/s) Population Serveda Participation in the amount of water supplied to the MRSP
Alto Cotia 1.2 0.41 1.64%
Alto da Boa Vista 14.0 3.70 19.13%
Baixo Cotia 0.9 0.42 1.23%
Casa Grande 4.0 2.06 5.46%
Guaraúb 33.0 9.00 45.1%
Ribeirão da Estiva 0.1 0.04 0.14%
Rio Grande 5.0 1.20 6.83%
Taiaçupeba 15.0 3.30 20.49%
Total 73.2 20.13 100%
TABLE 1 – Water Treatment Stations in the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo – Production and Population Served.
a Millions of inhabitants
b Cantareira System treatment plant
SOURCE: Côrtes et al. (2015).
FIGURE 2 – Schematic diagram of the Cantareira System. 
SOURCE: Adapted from SABESP (2006; 2007; 2008; 2009a; 2009b; 2009c; 2011; 2012).
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4. Water availability and climate dependence 
in the metropolitan region of São Paulo  
Since 1950, seven periods of more pronounced 
shortages have occurred (Figure 3). It shows that re-
ductions in the annual volume of rainfall are not rare 
situations and should be considered in the planning 
of the supply system of the Metropolitan Region 
of São Paulo. It is interesting to verify, however, 
the behavior of the supply system during the two 
most recent crises. The penultimate dates back to 
2003 - 2004, and the last one started in 2013. These 
cycles are related to the El Niño-Southern Oscilla-
tion (ENSO), as shown by Côrtes et al. (2015) and 
discussed later in this paper.
More recently, between January 2005 and 
December 2012 (the period between the two most 
recent crises), the system was working under 
normal conditions (Figure 4). Taking the monthly 
water averages available to the population into 
consideration, it is revealed that the system has 
always worked close to the operational limit or, 
sometimes, above it. Figure 4 shows that the supply 
system worked at the very least, requiring 93% of 
its operational capacity (working with a gap of only 
7%). Considering this as a normal situation, we 
must inquire how the system would work in case 
of more prolonged or more intense droughts. Since 
the system, in a normal situation, works very close 
to its full operational capacity, it cannot withstand a 
more significant reduction in the volume of rainfall. 
There would be no operational gap because of the 
low elasticity of the system.
As shown in Figure 4, in the ten years before 
the last supply crisis, the water supply system of the 
MRSP worked very close to its operational limit. 
Thus it is possible to affirm that this system cannot 
withstand climatic events such as more severe drou-
ghts or more extended rainfall reductions. It evinces 
the importance of investigating climate issues. The 
analysis of the system levels since 2004 (Figure 5) 
demonstrates that the recharge period occurs from 
October to March of each year. Since 2011 until the 
beginning of the crisis in 2013, however, there has 
been a reduction in the system-level re-composition, 
represented by the straight line (AB) in Figure 5. 
The maximum volume was below the level obtained 
in the previous year, which could have been used 
for the design of preventive measures (Galpin & 
Whittington, 2012; Galbreath, 2014).
A study conducted by Côrtes et al. (2015) 
shows that the dams recharge periods with a predo-
minance of the El Niño phase present higher rainfall 
volume for the city of São Paulo. According to the 
study, it is during El Niño that the rainy season 
extends until autumn (a season traditionally drier) 
and expands the recharge of the Cantareira System 
(Côrtes et al., 2015). The period of most considerab-
le decrease in the volume of the System (represented 
by the line AB in Figure 5) occurs predominantly in 
a neutral phase of the ENSO phenomenon, which 
was verified in the period from April 2012 to April 
2013.
Figure 6 shows that throughout 2009, with the 
presence of the La Niña phase of the ENSO pheno-
menon, there was a decrease of almost 30 % in the 
Cantareira System level. However, it was rapidly 
recovered in 2010 with the beginning of the El Niño 
phase, which remained intense until the middle of 
the second half of that year. As a result, the decrease 
in the Cantareira System-level was approximately 
25% in 2010 (5% less than the prior year). From 
2011 onwards, with the predominance of the La 
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Niña phase, and with brief periods of ENSO neutral 
phase, the re-composition of the System-level was 
lower than the previous year, given evidence of the 
tendency to reduce the volume stored, as indicated 
by the line AB in Figure 6.
Figure 7 contributes to the understanding of 
this scenario through a comparison between the 
phases of the ENSO phenomenon and the inlet of 
water (recharge) of the Cantareira System. This 
figure presents a vital reference value:  the average 
annual water intake of the Cantareira System for 
the year 1953. Before the recent crisis, this year 
represented the worst scenario known. The orange 
arrows in Figure 6 show the episodes in which this 
reference line was reached or even crossed from 
2009. It is possible to verify that all these episodes 
are related to a weaker La Niña phase or a neutral 
phase of the ENSO phenomenon. Besides, it is no-
ted that, especially from May 2013 onwards, this 
line was crossed, and the water inlet became lower 
than the reference line. This scenario remained so 
due to the predominance of the neutral phase of the 
ENSO phenomenon.
The red line at the top of Figure 7 shows the 
use of water from the Cantareira System. In many 
cases where the water inlet (represented by the 
blue line) was reduced, the outlet remained higher. 
It occurred in particular from May 2013 onwards, 
with a brief interruption at the beginning of 2015. 
It contributed to a drastic reduction in the volume 
of the dams in the Cantareira System, aggravating 
the scenario of scarcity. It shows that the problem 
of strategic management of the system existed 
before the crisis (when climatic influences on the 
functioning of the System were ignored) and during 
the crisis (when the outlet was maintained higher 
than the water inlet). In May 2013, the water inlet 
became very low, and the climatic prognoses indica-
ted a higher probability of occurrence of the ENSO 
neutral phase, as indicated by Figure 8.
Both the dynamic and statistical models indi-
cated that the temperature anomaly on the surface 
of the Pacific Ocean in the El Niño 3.4 region would 
remain between -0.5 ºC and +0.5 ºC, predicting 
the occurrence of a neutral phase. This prognosis 
was confirmed, leading to a significant reduction 
in the water inlet of the Cantareira System. If this 
forecast had been taken into account at that point, 
the use of water from the Cantareira System would 
have been reduced, thus preserving the conditions 
of the reservoirs.
5. Development of the water crisis 
Although the levels of the Cantareira System 
and climate forecasts consistently indicated the 
existence of problems since May 2013, it was only 
at the beginning of 2014 that the State Government 
of São Paulo would acknowledge the existence of 
a water supply crisis (Côrtes, 2017). As the water 
outlet did not suffer a significant reduction, being 
above the water inlet in the System, the water level 
dropped rapidly. In May 2014, the level of two 
reservoirs was deficient, making it impossible to 
transfer their content by gravity to a third reservoir. 
What remained in these reservoirs consisted of a 
volume intended to accommodate sediment and 
whose exploitation was not foreseen. Once called 
“dead volume,” this reserve was renamed “technical 
reserve” by the government technical team. It was 
a communication strategy aimed at smoothing the 
impacts of the crisis because the government tried 
to convince the population that this was a strategic 
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FIGURE 3 – Total annual rainfall in the city of São Paulo between 1950 and 2014. 
SOURCE: Elaborated by the authors from data provided by the Astronomical and Geophysical Institute of the University of São Paulo.
FIGURE 4 – Operational situation of the water supply system in the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo between 2004 and 2012 based on the 
average monthly volumes. 
SOURCE: Adapted from SABESP (2006; 2007; 2008; 2009a; 2009b; 2009c; 2011; 2012).
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FIGURE 5 – Evolution of the Cantareira System volume between 2004 and 2014.
SOURCE: Adapted from National Water Agency (2014, p. 9).
FIGURE 6 – Correlation between the phases of the ENSO phenomenon and the level of the Cantareira System in the years prior to the water crisis. 
SOURCE: Elaborated by the authors based on data from the National Water Agency (2014) and data from the Climate Prediction Center of the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (CPC/NOAA).
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FIGURE 7 – Correlation between the phases of the ENSO phenomenon and the water intake and outflow of the Cantareira System (2009 to 
mid-2015). 
SOURCE: Elaborated by the authors based on information from the National Water Agency (2014).
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FIGURE 8 – Forecast of the ENSO phenomenon from the May/June/January (MJJ) quarter of 2013 to the January/February/March (JFM) 
quarter of 2014. 
SOURCE: Elaborated by the authors with data from the International Research Institute for Climate and Society (Earth Institute) - Columbia 
University. Available on: http://iri.columbia.edu/our-expertise/climate/forecasts/enso/archive/201305/SST_table .html
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reserve for times of crisis. Therefore, the “dead 
volume” - originally intended not to be used - was 
incorporated into the Cantareira System, artificially 
increasing its levels (Côrtes, 2017).
The crisis showed the fragility of the system 
of water governance in the Metropolitan Region. It 
highlighted decades of inadequate practices of water 
management, mainly linked to the bad quality of 
some waterways resulting from the no conclusion of 
the primary sewage treatment system that has been 
very delayed, directly implying in the impossibility 
of its use to supply the population. Desirable demo-
cratic governance initiatives were not tackled, as the 
action of the state government was not transparent, 
and not only the water basin committees but also the 
State Council of Water Resources were undermined 
from discussions and decision-making process to 
confront the crisis (Jacobi et al., 2015).
The lack of transparency and accountability 
is manifested mainly when the state does not pro-
mote initiatives that stimulate the co-responsibility 
of the population, as authorities masked the crisis 
until the moment when it was not possible to do 
it anymore. Decisions were taken at the central 
level of government - i.e., linked directly to the 
governor (Côrtes, 2017). The main reason was the 
interference of an electoral agenda at the state and 
federal levels, and the government did not want 
to take an anti-popular position by promoting a 
preventive turnover, notwithstanding the situation 
was becoming extreme (Côrtes, 2017). Besides that, 
peripheral neighborhoods and settlements lived un-
der constant interruptions of water supply. However, 
the water management company affirmed that there 
were no abnormalities in the supply (Fracalanza 
& Freire, 2015). It reinforces that, in addition to 
wrong political decisions, the system suffers from 
structural problems.
The leading cause for the worst water crisis 
in the region emphasized by the government of 
São Paulo and by part of the media was the lack 
of rain in the summer of 2013/20141. It has to be 
noted that since the end of 2013, the level of the 
reservoirs had been falling due to climatic factors, 
but other aspects also led to the critical situation of 
the reservoirs (Coutinho et al., 2015). 
It is also essential to take into account that 
deforestation and inadequate land use in watershed 
areas (Coutinho et al., 2015), the lack of planning 
for the construction of new reservoirs, the lack of 
investments to reduce leaking that attain around 
30% (SABESP, 2019), and the lack of institutional 
coordination are other relevant causes of the crisis 
(Rodrigues & Villela, 2015). 
Government strategies were used, emphasi-
zing mainly the reduction of the pressure in the 
water distribution system. The reduction of pres-
sure, according to Sabesp, is a common practice 
of sanitation companies to reduce water leakages. 
During the water crisis, Sabesp intensified this 
process in order to confront the water scarcity and 
to avoid, according to the information available on 
their website, the exhaustion of its reservoirs and 
to contribute to the maintenance of supply until the 
normality of rain was recovered.
1 Analysis developed by the Research Group GovAmb of the Institute of Energy and Environment of the University of São Paulo (IEE/USP) in 
partnership with the NGO Institute Democracy and Sustainability (IDS). Available on: http://www.idsbrasil.org/iniciativa/2/
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6. Denouncing the crisis: environmental 
justice and resistance
During the crisis, water rationing occurred in 
several municipalities of the São Paulo Metropolitan 
Region. These interruptions could last from several 
hours to several days in some neighborhoods. The 
government preferred to call these two actions 
“water restriction” rather than to use the term “ra-
tioning”—these semantic strategies aimed at poorly 
informing people and sought to minimize negative 
perceptions among the population.
During the crisis, the educational actions un-
dertaken by Sabesp were minimal. There were no 
instructions on ways to save water, no explanation 
about techniques for reusing water, or information 
about possibilities regarding the collection of 
rainwater. The impression was that Sabesp feared 
that consumption would remain low after the crisis 
and damage their profits (Côrtes, 2017). 
One strategy applied by Sabesp was the reduc-
tion of the tariff per cubic meter if the consumption 
was lower than the average. On the other hand, the 
tariff was increased for consumers who did not re-
duce their consumption. However, the practice of 
granting price reduction as an incentive to moderate 
usage ended when the government considered that 
the crisis was over in early 2015. In this context, 
preventive and adaptive management should have 
been done once the water vulnerability of the region 
was diagnosed.
However, public officials ignored the collabo-
rative and integrated management of urban water 
sources and participatory governance. The officials 
prioritized emergency actions to interconnect the 
supply systems, disregarding social and environ-
mental issues, and the environmental licensing 
process (Jacobi et al., 2015). 
The decision-making process that structured 
the emergency actions were conducted without 
consulting the water basin committees, what created 
conflicts with other states, such as Rio de Janeiro, 
since part of the solutions involved the Paraiba 
do Sul river, belonging to the watershed located 
between the states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro 
(Côrtes, 2017). These public actions were defined 
without any debate, and the questioning of the civil 
society was ignored.
As can be seen, the process was politically in-
coherent, for there was a lack of transparency in the 
communication of the measures taken regarding the 
crisis as well as centralization in decision-making. 
The state government consistently denied the mag-
nitude of the crisis and thus hindered the involve-
ment of society, which could not confront it. Thus, 
as well as the fact that no water basin committee was 
taken into account, was a justification for initiatives 
of different articulations of NGOs and community 
organizations (Jacobi et al., 2015). 
Through a historical analysis, the refractory 
position of the state government on publicizing 
the crisis is evident (Côrtes et al., 2015). The daily 
bulletins on the volume of water in reservoirs were 
questioned continuously, and at a particular moment 
of the crisis, in April 2015, the Public Prosecution at 
the Federal and the State levels determined that the 
adequate volume of water of the Cantareira reservoir 
should be disclosed, disregarding the dead volume. 
This intervention was needed to highlight existing 
problems and force the state government to take the 
right steps to address the water crisis. There was 
a lack of communication and dialogue, as well as 
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proposals and information, which made it difficult 
for different stakeholders to debate (Côrtes, 2017).
Throughout the crisis, the State Government 
emphasized that the main reason for the crisis was 
related to climatic factors, and made practically no 
reference to the existing system of governance and 
its relation to the problem (IAG, 2014). The civil 
society noticed the critical situation of the region in 
2015 and got mobilized, not only to show awareness 
of the lack of management, but also the detection of 
lack of governance and, in this scenario, discovered 
opportunities of action (Jacobi et al., 2015).
Grassroots and non-governmental organiza-
tions developed activities, actions, initiatives, and 
projects to inform the population, focusing on the 
actions of public officials and working cohesively 
for water governance by promoting a new culture 
of water conservation (Jacobi et al., 2015). The 
movements and articulations of NGOs developed 
strategies to denounce the crisis. They pressured 
authorities to allow the participation of civil society 
with propositions and solutions, in order to gua-
rantee equity in the access of water and to expand 
the channels of mobilization and denouncement of 
environmental injustice (Fracalanza & Freire, 2015; 
Ribeiro, 2017).  
Specialists of the field already anticipated the 
possibility of an extremely critical situation for at 
least a decade, especially in São Paulo, where an 
upcoming shortage of water in a level that consump-
tion would exceed water availability was already 
expected (Empinotti et al., 2018, Klink et al., 2019). 
In São Paulo, during the crisis of 2013-2015, the 
decreases in rainfall in the southeastern region of 
Brazil presented a predictable scenario of water 
scarcity for 2014-2015. However, it is essential to 
note that, in addition to difficulties related to hydro-
logical cycles and water availability, human-made 
factors also interfered in the quality and quantity 
of the resource: inland sewage disposal, the effects 
of climate change on water production and the 
lack of investments to improve water storage and 
distribution infrastructure for governing complexity 
(Thiel et al., 2019).
The lack of governance regarding the water 
management system was already envisaged by spe-
cialists since the end of the 1980s, as recommenda-
tions were made to increase water availability in the 
region and less dependency on water import from 
neighboring watersheds. In 2004, the Department 
of Water and Electric Energy (DAEE) responsible 
for the management of water resources and coor-
dinator of the integrated system of the State of São 
Paulo recommended a set of actions to increase 
water availability. The NGO Article 19 concluded 
that the transparency of the State of São Paulo on 
the water management system was insufficient and 
lacked in broadening channels of information and 
in providing data quality (Empinotti et al., 2018).
7. Preliminary conclusions
The MRSP water crisis caused impacts of dif-
ferent levels, ranging from the interruption of water 
supply in municipalities to the negative impacts on 
aquatic ecosystems of reservoirs and waterways. 
The lack of capacity of the state government to 
articulate preventive and adaptive actions exposes, 
in practice, a decision-making process that does 
not take into account adequately the integration of 
different environmental public policies – e.g., water 
supply, sanitation, climate change and protection of 
areas surrounding watersheds. 
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With a technical and centralizing discourse, 
remarking that the main reason for the crisis was 
the lack of rain, authorities removed any integration 
and dialogue with the population. The perception 
that the hydric crisis was mainly a management 
problem was strengthened by the fact that the go-
vernment of São Paulo lacked transparency on their 
stance. Furthermore, the water management system 
is shown as unprepared for the effects of climate 
change, which tend to be more frequent and reach 
mainly the poorest sections of the population (Torres 
& Leonel, 2019). 
One of the most significant challenges in 
governing complexity is to include environmental 
justice paradigms, anticipatory actions, and transpa-
rency in governmental planning and public policies. 
It implies not only changes in the system of accou-
ntability to society by public and private managers 
but also in cultural and behavioral changes.
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